Lebanon—already
crippled by overlapping political, economic, and regional crises—faces
catastrophic consequences from the COVID-19 pandemic.
The
worsening public health crisis has magnified Lebanon’s severe economic, fiscal,
and foreign-debt problems and has undermined efforts to address other critical
issues, such as corruption, sectarian tensions, and poor governance.
Even worse, the pandemic is likely to exacerbate Lebanon’s political instability, fuel conflict between rival political factions competing to secure scarce medical resources for their supporters, and aggravate tensions between Lebanese citizens and desperate refugees who have flooded in from neighboring Syria.
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Lebanon is facing its worst crisis since the end of its civil war in 1990 as it struggles to cope with the effects of COVID-19, the disease caused by the new coronavirus, hampered by an economy that already was on the verge of collapse and a new government that’s struggling to gain legitimacy.
A Looming Perfect
Storm
Lebanon
has many vulnerabilities that could contribute to a perfect storm. Ruled by a weak and
dysfunctional government that is distrusted by many—if not most—Lebanese
citizens, the country has large numbers of urban poor living in cramped
quarters.
Lebanon
also hosts 1.5 million Syrian refugees, the highest per-capita ratio of
refugees to citizens in the world. Many of the refugees live in tents or
squalid buildings where social distancing and regular hand-washing are nearly
impossible.
The
coronavirus could not have hit Lebanon at a worse time. Just a month after
Lebanon’s newly appointed prime minister, Hassan Diab, formed the new
government on Jan. 21, the first cases of
coronavirus began to appear. On March 15, President Michel Aoun declared a medical state of
emergency in Lebanon.
Lockdown
measures, such as the closure of nonessential businesses and banks, as well as
a curfew, were later implemented to slow the spread.
Though
Lebanon’s health care system is considered relatively strong, the financial
crisis has caused medical-supply shortages, heightening fears that the number
of cases could surge without proper supplies to treat patients.
The
number of cases reported is just over 650
infected, with 21 dead, as of April 15, although the actual numbers are
suspected to be much higher.
As
the country continues to battle the virus, economic and political ramifications
are already starting to play out.
An Economic House of
Cards
The
economy is close to collapse. The Lebanese lira
has depreciated by more than 60% of
its value since October, causing price hikes of essential imported goods, while
an estimated 17% of the workforce have been out of jobs since September.
With
more than $90 billion in debt, Lebanon is saddled with the third-highest
debt-to-gross domestic product ratio in the world. Interest payments consume
almost half of government revenues, and the debt burden is likely to grow
heavier.
Before the COVID-19 lockdown-induced economic slump hit, Lebanon’s GDP was projected to fall by an estimated 12% in 2020. The closure of Lebanon’s bars, restaurants, nightclubs, and many other small businesses, combined with declining remittances from expatriate Lebanese workers in foreign countries, leaves little hope that the country can recover anytime soon.
The result might be that the health crisis triggers a second wave of anti-government protests after the pandemic.
Since
October, Lebanon has been wracked by mass protests against the
governing elite. A new tax on messaging apps ignited spontaneous demonstrations
against the entrenched and corrupt political oligarchs who long have failed to
deliver adequate basic services while siphoning off state resources to feather
their own nests and enrich their cronies.
Though
the multisectarian protest movement did pressure then-Prime Minister Saad
Hariri to resign in late October, his government has been replaced by a new
coalition government dominated by Hezbollah, the Iran-backed Shiite extremist
movement.
Hezbollah,
a major target of the protests, seized on the coronavirus outbreak as a
convenient pretext to put an end to mass demonstrations.
On March 27, Lebanese security
forces dismantled tents and forcibly evicted demonstrators in Martyrs’ Square
in Beirut, the epicenter of the protest movement. Citing social distancing and
the implementation of the curfew, the government has used the virus outbreak as
an excuse to suppress the protest movement.
That
has forced the protesters to continue the movement through social media. Public
seminars have now transitioned online, including both political and educational
sessions.
Activists
continue to stress the deep suffering of the Lebanese people, worsened by the
government’s slow response to the crisis. In the absence of government
leadership, activists and protesters fear the resurgence of traditional
political actors who have stepped up in recent weeks to compensate for weak
public institutions.
Controlling
the Health Ministry under Diab’s new government, Hezbollah’s Islamic Health Unit
is leading the government-effort in combating the virus.
The group claims to have mobilized 24,500 members and volunteers and allocated $2.3 million in a public relations campaign to highlight its governance services and social-welfare networks. Food items have been delivered to people in need, COVID-19 testing sites have been set up, and ambulances were made ready to care for patients.
Other
sectarian political parties have also stepped up their patronage efforts to bolster their
damaged images. Political parties such as the predominantly Christian Free
Patriotic Movement, the rival Christian Lebanese Forces Movement, the Shiite
Amal Movement, and the Druze-led Progressive Socialist Party have implemented awareness
campaigns, delivered food packages, and made donations to help hospitals in
their communities.
Like
Hezbollah, these groups are trying to gain back the influence and political
support that has been lost since the protests mushroomed in October.
Viral Propaganda
Battles
The
rival political parties also have engaged in a blame game about the source of
Lebanon’s coronavirus outbreak.
Hezbollah, which long has served as Iran’s terrorist surrogate, was accused of stalling a ban on travel from Iran, a major conduit for the transmission of the virus from China to the Middle East.
Hezbollah undoubtedly wanted to protect the image of its Iranian patron and to satisfy its own logistical needs, which include massive transfers of increasingly sophisticated Iranian rockets and precision-guided weapons. It responded with a propaganda campaign that blamed Lebanon’s health crisis on Catholic clerics returning from Italy.
Regardless
of the efforts by traditional political elites, nearly half of Lebanon’s
population could end up living below the poverty line post-pandemic. The
government has so far refused an International Monetary Fund bailout, meaning
that there is little hope for a stimulus package to compensate for lost
businesses or a massive loan to finance the purchase of essential imports,
food, and medical supplies.
Unless
the Lebanese government takes serious steps to regain popular support by
rooting out corruption, digging itself out of its economic hole, and providing
clear leadership during this health crisis, round two of protests could trigger
political turmoil that may be the straw that breaks the camel’s back.
For
more information on this topic:
Middle
East Coronavirus Data Sketchy, Leaving Populaces to Suffer
Why
Protests Rocking Lebanon Forced Out the Prime Minister
How
Protests Undermine Iran and Its Proxies in Iraq and Lebanon
Iran’s
Coronavirus Propaganda Scapegoats America
Iranian
Regime’s Reckless Disregard Made the Coronavirus Outbreak Worse
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